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ARTICLES




This article considers how to balance the benefits to consumers
and to creators of intellectual property from enforcing exclusive
rights with the benefits to consumers and to competitors from
permitting free-riding in the context of resale of trademarked goods.
Exclusive rights limit the incentive-undermining effect of one person
reaping the benefits of another's investment without paying. The first
sale rule in copyright, patent, and trademark law complements the
rationale for exclusive rights. Once a person has paid the price
demanded by the rights-holder for the article embodying the
expression, invention, or source-indicating symbol, the free-riding
concern has normally been addressed. The first sale rule permits the
buyer to resell that article. Consumers of intellectual property benefit
from encouraging the fixation of original expressions, disclosure of
novel and non-obvious inventions, and promulgation of symbols
indicating the source, qualities, and characteristics of products.
Trademarks are unique because consumers retain an interest in
maintaining creators' exclusive rights to source-indicating symbols
beyond providing an incentive to produce the information. To ensure
continuity in a symbol's ability to distinguish one supplier's goods
from others and protect consumers' ability to locate goods that satisfy
their needs in the future, the law limits buyers' rights to resell goods
bearing others' marks. Consumers may be misled if trademark goods
are modified, repackaged, or incorporated into other goods that are
then resold with the trademark affixed. Stimulated by a 2010 Ninth
Circuit opinion prohibiting such resales even if buyer is not confused,
this article explores the proper scope of the trademark first sale
defense.
457
t Distinguished Research Professor of Law, Seton Hall School of Law.
458 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 27
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2010, in what appears to be the first case addressing the
issue, the Federal Circuit Court for the Ninth Circuit relied on the
free-rider rationale to hold that the first sale rule was not an
affirmative defense in trademark post-sale confusion cases.' At stake
were consumers' interests in knowing the sources, qualities, and
characteristic(s) of goods they purchase, the ability of trademark
owners to reap the benefits of their trademark investments,
competition in product and service markets, the prices consumers pay
for goods, consumer choice among competing products, and the
availability of new products. The co-incidence of consumers' and
trademark owners' interests may provide legitimate grounds for
distinguishing trademark first sale doctrine from copyright and patent
first sale doctrine. The free-rider rationale, however, provides no
coherent basis for determining whether another's trademark use
should infringe the mark owner's rights without considering the
benefits of limiting exclusive intellectual property rights.
This article explores the first sale rule, its rationales, and its
procedural effect as a defense in intellectual property law generally
and trademark law particularly. Part II examines the first sale rule and
its rationales. The rule permits buyers of the physical manifestations
of intellectual property-the CD on which the musical expression is
recorded, the machine in which the invention is embodied, the article
to which the trademark is affixed-to resell those objects without
intellectual property law restraints. The first sale rule reflects property
law's distaste for restraints on alienation and allows the holder of
intellectual property rights to obtain the price for its creations only
once. When a trademarked article that has been modified by its buyer
is in some way marketed to third parties, however, there is potential
for consumer confusion about the source of the good and the article's
qualities and characteristics. This creates a conflict between the first
sale rule, which encourages competition between new and used or
modified products, and trademark law's goal of preventing consumers
from being misled.
While the first sale rule is typically an absolute defense in
intellectual property law, the conflict between the first sale rule and
the goal of preventing confusion in trademark law calls for
reconsideration of the procedural effect of asserting a first sale
defense. Part III examines the historical treatment of first sale as an
1. Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th
Cir. 2010).
TRADEMARK LAW'S FIRST SALE RULE
affirmative defense in trademark law, where it has arisen along with
the issue of whether the resold goods were genuine and lawfully
acquired or had been materially altered. Before the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., there were no opinions considering first sale in the
context of admittedly genuine goods where the resale potentially
caused confusion only to people other than the purchaser of the
goods. The Supreme Court's most recent discussion of trademark
defenses, 2 reversing another Ninth Circuit opinion,3 held that some
consumer confusion resulting from descriptive use of another's mark
would be tolerated to promote another trademark goal, promoting
competition. The Supreme Court's balancing approach in that context
suggests that first sale might be treated neither as an absolute defense,
as in copyright and patent law, nor as irrelevant, as the Au-Tomotive
Gold opinion suggests.
Treating the legitimate first sale of a trademarked item as
irrelevant elevates the goal of preventing free-riding on the labors of
others-reaping where another has sewn-to primary importance
among justifications for robust intellectual property protection. Part
IV argues that intellectual property law generally, and trademark law
particularly, takes a more nuanced view of free-riding. While many
trademark doctrines are justified by the rationale of preventing free-
riding, courts and scholars recognize that some free-riding is desirable
and inevitable. The issue for intellectual property law is deciding the
extent to which exclusive rights should be enforced and when
unfettered use of intellectual property creations should be allowed.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the first sale defense in Au-
Tomotive Gold was based on two lines of cases explored in Part V.
The first line of cases recognizes the first sale defense. Where the
trademark owner's goods were simply stocked, displayed, and resold
by a reseller, the fact that consumers might erroneously believe that
the reseller was affiliated with the owner did not render the first sale
rule inapplicable. Where the goods were repackaged, a notice
informing consumers of that fact might be necessary to prevent
confusion. The second line of cases involves reconstruction and repair
of trademarked goods that did not involve the first sale rule. These
cases recognized that infringement might be based on facts showing
no confusion by the purchaser, but only by others, so-called post-sale
or post-purchase confusion. While the Ninth Circuit did not discuss in
2. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
3. Id. at 124, rev'g, 328 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2003).
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detail what harms might flow from this secondary level of confusion,
other courts have. These other courts have identified harms to both
consumers and trademark owners from the sale of imitation luxury
goods, for instance, or of goods inferior in quality to the trademark
owners' goods. These harms are less likely to occur in the first sale
context. Part V concludes with a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's
dismissal of a defendant's argument that it was not a free-rider
because it had paid the price asked by the trademark owner for the
item used as a component of its product and compares it to the
Supreme Court's implicit treatment of free-riding in its most recent
trademark defense case.
Part VI concludes by identifying distinctions between trademark
law and copyright and patent law that might justify different treatment
of the first sale rule. While creators and users have a co-incident
interest in providing creators financial incentives to produce
intellectual property, users of copyrighted expressions and patented
inventions seek free access to those creations after creation. This is
not entirely true of trademarks, where consumers retain an interest in
a single supplier's exclusive use of a mark in order to be sure that
they are getting the particular brand of goods they desire. Consumers
also benefit, however, from other suppliers being able to refer to their
competitors' products, by way of comparison, or being able to use
descriptive terms another might have trademarked to convey
information about the qualities and characteristics of their products.
There are many examples in trademark law of conflicting consumer
interests that need to be balanced by courts when deciding when free-
riding should be permitted. While emphasizing the Supreme Court's
balancing approach to trademark defenses, this article does not take a
position on what the precise procedural effect of the first sale rule
should be in all cases. Rather, it argues that it is inappropriate to hold
that the first sale rule is inapplicable where the only potential for
confusion is among people other than the purchaser of the article.
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II. THE FIRST SALE RULE AND ITS RATIONALES
The first sale rule limits exclusive rights in all three principle
forms of intellectual property.4 A person who owns a lawfully-made
copy of a copyrighted work may "sell or otherwise dispose" of that
copy without authorization of the copyright owner.' An
unconditioned sale of a patented item exhausts the rights of the patent
holder to put any condition on the resale of that item.6 Similarly, "the
right of a producer to control distribution of its trademarked product
does not extend beyond the first sale of the product."7 A person who
buys a limited-edition copyrighted bronze sculpture from the sculptor
(or his or her assignee) may resell it, despite the creator's exclusive
statutory distribution rights.8 A person who buys a patented machine
from the inventor may resell it without permission, despite the
inventor's exclusive statutory right to sell the machine.9 In trademark
law, the first sale rule would permit the buyer of an article supplied by
a trademark owner to resell the article with the owner's mark
attached. In each case, the first sale rule narrows the rights of the
creator of intellectual property by creating competition between the
creator and the reseller of the work.
4. Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1448 (11th Cir. 1998).
The first-sale doctrine limits the three principal forms of intellectual property
rights: (1) copyright, see 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) ("[T]he owner of a particular copy
or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord."); (2) patent,
see Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed.Cir.1993)
("The law is well settled that an authorized sale of a patented product places that
product beyond the reach of the patent. The patent owner's rights with respect to
the product end with its sale, and a purchaser of such a product may use or resell
the product free of the patent.") (internal cites omitted); and (3) trademark, see
NEC Electronics v. CAL Circuit ABCO, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir.1987)
("Once a trademark owner sells his product, the buyer ordinarily may resell the
product under the original mark without incurring any trademark liability.")
(citing Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924)).
Id
5. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
6. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917). In
patent law, the terms "first sale" and "patent exhaustion" are used interchangeably. See 5
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §16.03[2][a] (2005).
7. Sebastian Intern., Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir.
1995) (citing Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924)). The principle that the goods must
have been legally acquired, apparent in the copyright statute, see note 1, supra, is equally
applicable in trademark. See, e.g., Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1237 (10th
Cir.2006) (discussing situation where reseller had purchased products by deceptive means).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
2011] 461
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The primary rationale for the first sale rule is uniform throughout
intellectual property generally. The first sale rule ensures that the
intellectual property rights holder earns only one fee for the sale of
each object.10 To put it somewhat differently, the exclusive
distribution right is no longer needed because the seller has obtained
its full desired price for the item.11 The rule follows the general legal
policy disfavoring restraints on alienation.12 It also follows the
specific intellectual property policy limiting rights to the extent
necessary to produce incentives necessary to encourage creative
activity."
The Ninth Circuit has elaborated on the general rationale for the
first sale rule as applied to trademark law, describing it as "a sensible
and stable accommodation between strong and potentially conflicting
10. Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration ofIntellectual Property? A Classical Liberal
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 505 (2010).
11. Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc'ns, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 373 (6th Cir.
2007) (citing Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1389
(C.D. Cal. 1993)).
12. Id. at 374 (discussing the copyright first sale rule) ("The first sale doctrine ensures
that the copyright monopoly does not intrude on the personal property rights of the individual
owner, given that the law generally disfavors restraints of trade and restraints on alienation. See
Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1096 (3d Cir.1988) ("The
first sale rule is statutory, but finds its origins in the common law aversion to limiting the
alienation of personal property."); H.R. REP. NO. 98-987 (1984), at 2 ("The first sale doctrine
has its roots in the English common law against restraints on alienation of property.")"). See
also Gerald Komgold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts of Real Property Law:
Preserving Fee Markets and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
1525, 1550-51 (2007) (discussing restraints on alienation in the context of real property); Glen
0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1489 (2004) (the
lawfulness of servitudes on personal property in both common law and intellectual property
regimes).
13. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("Creative work
is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts."); Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("The monopoly privileges that Congress
may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit.
Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of
exclusive control has expired."); Id at 429 n. 10 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1909) ("Congress must consider ... two questions: First, how much will the legislation
stimulate the producer and so benefit the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly
granted be detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper
terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary
monopoly."); Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 801, 813 n. 49 ("Of course, the need to balance incentives and access is nothing
new and has been a long-standing feature of intellectual property scholarship in general and the
economic analysis of intellectual property in particular.").
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forces."l 4 In another case, the Ninth Circuit stated that "trademark
law is designed to prevent sellers from confusing or deceiving
consumers about the origin or make of a product, which confusion
ordinarily does not exist when a genuine article bearing a true mark is
sold."' 5 On one hand, there is the interest of suppliers in obtaining a
return on their investment in the supply of information embodied in
the trademark, information about the source, qualities and
characteristics of the goods or services.16 In addition, there is the
interest of consumers in getting exactly what they bargained for,
which is "the genuine product of a particular producer."' 7 On the
other hand, the first sale rule encourages competition by permitting
others to resell the product after the producer has obtained the price it
sought for the initial purchase.' 8 The balance between incentive for
creation and limits on monopoly power to promote competition
pervades intellectual property law in general,19 and trademark law in
particular.20
There are limits on the first sale rule in trademark law. Of
particular importance is the requirement that resellers do not deceive
purchasers about the nature of their relationship to the trademark
owner. In a leading case where trademarked spark plugs had been
reconditioned and resold by someone other than the trademark
owner,21 the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
stated:
It is well settled by the authorities that the defendants have a right
to sell an article manufactured by the plaintiff and to say that it has
been so manufactured by retaining the latter's trade-mark and style
numbers to indicate the origin of the goods.. . . They have only to
tell the truth, and the whole truth, and to tell it plainly. It is,
therefore, unimportant whether their reconditioned spark plugs
were as good as the original ones, although they seem to have been
adequate for the purposes for which they were to be used, but only
14. Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 1995).
15. NEC Electronics, Inc. v. CAL Circuit Abco, Inc., 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th
Cir.1987).
16. Sebastian Int'l., 53 F.3d at 1075.
17. Id
18. Id.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See Stacey L. Dogan, Trademark Remedies and Online Intermediaries, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 467, 469-71 nn. 9-14 (2010) (listing sources discussing the pro- and anti-
competitive effects of trademark policy).
21. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 156 F.2d 488, 491 (2d Cir. 1946), aff'd, 331
U.S. 125 (1947).
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whether the purchaser was apprized [sic] of the real facts.22
This issue of what conduct is required to show a lack of truthfulness
typically arises where the reseller repackages 23 or reconditions 24
trademarked goods, or misrepresents that they are an authorized
distributor or licensee for the trademark owner, 2 5 but it may also arise
where the reseller is marketing the same, unmodified genuine goods
as the mark owner.
The Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal look for some culpable
conduct that deceives consumers in a reseller case where the first sale
defense is asserted. In a Fifth Circuit case,27 the defendant acquired
and placed on its shelves the plaintiffs hair products containing
plaintiffs labels saying "Sold Only in Professional Salons." 2 8 Citing
the Ninth Circuit's opinion in NEC Electronics v. CAL Circuit
Abco," the Fifth Circuit stated that "[a]bsent more culpable conduct
on the part of the seller, we are unwilling to find misrepresentation in
the mere act of putting a manufacturer's product on one's shelf and
offering it for sale." 30 The Ninth Circuit in NEC had applied the first
sale rule to reverse an injunction in a case where the facts showed that
some consumers were confused about whether the genuine computer
chips purchased by the defendant from a foreign source were covered
by the plaintiffs warranties. 3' The Ninth Circuit later affirmed this
perspective on the first sale rule in a case involving a simple
"restocking and reselling" of the trademark owner's goods
characterizing this as "the precise conduct excluded from the Lanham
Act by the 'first sale' rule."32 The first sale rule, then, tolerates some
22. Champion Spark Plug, 156 F.2d at 491-92.
23. See, e.g., Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 350 (1924) (applying the first sale rule
to the sale of repackaged toilet powders and perfumes).
24. See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug, 156 F.2d at 491 (applying the first sale rule to the
sale of reconditioned spark plugs).
25. See, e.g., Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, 750 F.2d 903 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(applying the first sale rule where reseller suggested it was one of the producer's franchisees).
26. Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that because the
goods were genuine, the reseller was not infringing on the defendant's mark).
27. Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., of Lafayette, 988 F.2d 587 (5th
Cir. 1993).
28. Id. at 589.
29. NEC Electronics v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1987).
30. Matrix Essentials, 988 F.2d at 593.
31. NEC Electronics, 810 F.2d at 1508. (the Ninth Circuit distinguished other cases
involving resale of trademarked goods first purchased abroad on the ground that the goods in the
present case had been manufactured by the plaintiff). Id at 1510.
32. Sebastian Intem., Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1075-76 (9th Cir.
1995).
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confusion, as the NEC case illustrates, and encourages competition.
III. THE PROCEDURAL EFFECT OF THE FIRST SALE RULE
In the few cases discussing the procedural status of the first sale
rule in trademark law, the first sale rule is often treated as an
affirmative defense to what would otherwise be an infringement of
the creator's rights. Treating the first sale rule as an affirmative
defense means that the trademark defendant has the burden of proving
that it was reselling genuine and lawfully acquired goods.33 The Third
Circuit took this approach in Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo,34
characterizing the first sale rule as an affirmative defense, though
requiring the trademark plaintiff to show that the goods were not
genuine as part of its prima facie case of infringement under Section
32 of the Lanham Act.35
The alternative procedural approach would be to place the
burden on the plaintiff to prove the converse as part of its prima facie
case. A 2010 Federal District Court opinion from New Jersey, Food
Sciences Corp. v Nagler,36 suggested that the Third Circuit in Iberia
Foods had not really considered the question of whether the first sale
rule would be an affirmative defense-though the Third Circuit
opinion regularly referred to the rule that way-and had placed the
burden with respect to the genuineness of the goods on the plaintiff.37
The Food Sciences court concluded that:
This is as it must be. It is an element of the infringement claim that
the Defendant's conduct causes confusion, which necessarily
requires allegations of sale of a materially different product
bearing the trademark or allegations of other conduct creating
confusion as to product origin (such as creating the false
33. An affirmative defense is defined as "A defendant's assertion of facts and arguments
that, if true, will defeat the plaintiffs or prosecution's claim, even if all the allegations in the
complaint are true. The defendant bears the burden of proving an affirmative defense." Black's
Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009).
34. Iberia Food Corps. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 1998). See also Mary Kay, Inc.
v. Weber, 661 F.Supp.2d 632, 638 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (identifying first sale as affirmative defense
and placing burden on defendant to prove that the defense applies). Unreported decisions
characterizing the first sale rule in trademark as an affirmative defense include Microsoft Corp.
v. Worth, No. Civ A 306-CV-2213-G, 2007 WL 1975574 (N.D. Tex., July 05, 2007) (not
reported in F. Supp. 2d); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Premium Tobacco Stores, Inc., No. 99 C
1174, 2001 WL 747422, (N.D. Ill., June 29, 2001) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d.); and Lehmann
v. San-Val Discount, Inc., No. 95-CV-771, 1996 WL 33333426 (C.D. Cal., May 22, 1996) (not
reported in F. Supp.).
35. See Iberia Foods, 150 F.3d at 301-02.
36. Food Sciences Corp. v. Nagler, No. 09-1798, slip op. 1 (D.N.J. March 22, 2010).
37. See id. at *7.
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impression of official authorization). 38
Because the plaintiff failed to show that the goods were not genuine,
the Food Sciences court dismissed the claim. 3 9 The court was not
required to consider the procedural effect of the first sale rule if the
goods had been genuine and dismissed without prejudice, stating that
the plaintiff might reasonably have been unaware that the first sale
rule was not an affirmative defense. 4 0 There are a few other opinions,
sometimes within the same circuit, disagreeing on the procedural
status of the first sale rule41 and opinions characterizing the first sale
rule as describing a situation (the resale of genuine goods) to which
the trademark law simply does not apply.42 If trademark law simply
does not apply to resold trademarked items, then the first sale rule is
an absolute defense, as in copyright and patent law.
Confusion about some trademark defenses stems in part from
their lack of explicit statutory foundation, though the burden of proof,
even of statutory trademark defenses, has confused courts. Proof of
genuineness of the goods being resold is intimately linked to the
question of whether there is likely to be confusion about the source of
the goods. If the goods are genuine, there can be no confusion
because the trademark appearing on the goods correctly identifies the
manufacturer. The plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit clearly
has the burden of showing that a likelihood of confusion arises from
38. Id. at *7 (internal citation omitted).
39. See id at *8, 10; see also Mary Kay, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 2d 632, 642 (concluding that
the first sale defense did not apply where the goods were not genuine).
40. See Food Sciences Corp., No. 09-1798, slip op. at 9 (D. N.J. March 22, 2010).
41. Compare Mary Kay, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 2d at 638 (identifying first sale as affirmative
defense), with Taylor Made Golf Co. v. MJT Consulting Group, LLC, 265 F. Supp. 2d 732, 739
(N.D. Tex. 2003) (finding the first sale rule was not an affirmative defense but rather a way of
defining an area where the Lanham Act did not reach in a case where the genuineness of the
goods was in question and placing burden of proving that they were not genuine on plaintiff).
42. See Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD Intern. Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1301-02 (11th Cir.
2001).
The resale of genuine trademarked goods generally does not constitute
infringement. This is for the simple reason that consumers are not confused as to
the origin of the goods: the origin has not changed as a result of the resale. Under
... the first-sale or exhaustion doctrine, the trademark protections of the Lanham
Act are exhausted after the trademark owner's first authorized sale of that
product. Therefore, even though a subsequent sale is without a trademark
owner's consent, the resale of a genuine good does not violate the Act (internal
citations omitted).
Id. See also Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Rauh Rubber, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1117, 1128 (D.
Minn. 1996), af'd, 130 F.3d 1305 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining the fundamental principle that
trademark law does not prevent the sale of genuine goods bearing a true mark even if the sale is
not authorized by the mark owner).
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the defendant's conduct.43 Who then has the burden with respect to
other issues involved in a trademark infringement case? Who, for
instance, bears the burden of proving that another's use of a mark is
descriptive and fair? Who must prove that another's resale involves
genuine goods lawfully purchased from the trademark owner? Both
involve situations in which competition benefits from the other's use
of the mark but some confusion may result. The Supreme Court has
held that descriptive fair use is an affirmative defense and that the
defendant does not have "a burden to negate any likelihood that the
practice complained of will confuse consumers about the origin of the
goods or services affected."44 It has not said whether the first sale
doctrine is an affirmative defense.
It is not surprising that courts are confused about how to
characterize the first sale rule and its procedural effect. The Supreme
Court addressed the burden of proof issue for fair descriptive use of a
trademarked term, 45 but stopped short of clarifying the procedural
effect of the rule.46 In KP Permanent, the counterclaim defendant,
KP, had used the term "micro colors" to describe the pigments it sold
for use in tattooing.47 The counterclaim plaintiff, Lasting Impression,
had trademarked the term "micro colors."48 When KP sought a
declaratory judgment that it had not infringed, 4 9 Lasting Impression
counterclaimed, suing KP for trademark infringement.so The Ninth
Circuit "appeared," according to the Supreme Court, to have held that
the counterclaim defendant had the burden to show that confusion
would not result from its descriptive use.51 Thus, the question
presented was whether a party raising the fair use defense has a
burden to negate any likelihood that the practice complained of will
confuse consumers about the origin of the goods or services
affected.52
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit,
stating that the fair use defense was an affirmative defense and, based
43. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. 543 U.S. 111, 117-18
(2004).
44. Id at 114.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 123.
47. Seeid.atll4.
48. Id. at 114-15.
49. Id at 115.
50. Id at 115-16.
51. Id at 116.
52. Id. at 114.
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on statutory interpretation, contained no obligation for the defendant
to demonstrate that no confusion would result from its descriptive
use.53 The finding was based on statutory language and logic, making
it only partially applicable to the common law first sale rule. The
Lanham Act requires the mark holder to show that the other's use is
"likely to cause confusion," in a trademark infringement case,54 but
requires that the alleged infringer show only that the mark was "used
fairly" in the fair use defense.55 Rules of statutory construction
require an interpretation that Congress' use of different terms in
different parts of the same statute was intentional.56 The omission of
the "likelihood of confusion" language from the portion of the statute
discussing defenses means that the party asserting the defense has no
burden to negate the potential for confusion."
The Supreme Court also concluded that it would be illogical to
impose the burden of negating the potential for confusion on a
trademark defendant. If fair use is an affirmative defense, it would bar
relief even if the trademark owner's prima facie case was sound.f A
trademark defendant already has the opportunity to rebut the
plaintiffs evidence to undercut the plaintiffs prima facie case. 59 If
the defense is to make sense, it must give the defendant something he
does not already have. A defense imposing such a burden on the
defendant would increase the defendant's obligation from creating a
position of equipoise, in which the court was "agnostic" about the
likelihood of confusion,60 to one where the court believed confusion
unlikely. A defendant would be unable to use such a defense in any
case where the evidence showed confusion was likely. That is the
only kind of case where a defendant would need the defense.6 1 While
the statutory reasoning does not clarify the status of the first sale rule,
the logic requiring a defense to remain available when the plaintiff
has made out a prima facie case is applicable. This would be
consistent with the first sale rule opinions describing the rule as an
53. Id. at 124.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).
55. See KP Permanent, 543 U.S at 118 (discussing the fair use defense found in 15
U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(4)).
56. Id (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v.
Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))).
57. See KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 118 (discussing the fair use defense found in 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)).
58. Id. at 120.
59. Id.atll8.
60. See id. at 120.
61. Id.
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affirmative defense or stating that the resale of genuine goods is not
covered by the trademark statute.62
There remains the question of the procedural effect of the
affirmative defense. Is the affirmative defense of first sale a complete
bar to the plaintiff s claim? With respect to this question, the Supreme
Court's opinion in the fair use context was somewhat ambiguous. The
most straightforward approach would be to hold that the successful
assertion of a defense would bar relief. This would mean that the
degree of confusion is irrelevant; descriptive fair use of another's
mark will always triumph if it accurately described the defendant's
goods. In support of this interpretation is the Court's quotation from a
Second Circuit opinion that "[i]f any confusion results, that is a risk
the plaintiff accepted when it decided to identify its product with a
mark that uses a well known descriptive phrase." 63 This suggests that
the plaintiff must suffer any confusion that results. Extending this to
the first sale context would mean that the resale of genuine goods
would be permitted regardless of the degree of confusion it caused
about the source of the goods.
The more plausible, and more open-ended, interpretation is that
the degree of confusion might be taken into account when considering
the fair use defense. The Court stated that "some possibility of
consumer confusion must be compatible with fair use and so it is."6
The common law tolerates "a certain degree of confusion on the part
of consumers" 65 because of the anticompetitive consequences of
allowing monopolization of a descriptive term.66 Having recognized
that the risk of consumer confusion does not rule out fair use, the
Court went no further than to say that the extent of confusion might
be relevant in determining whether the use was fair. If the first sale
rule were interpreted the same way, the competitive justification for
the first sale rule 68 might require a similar balancing of the policy
objectives underlying the goal of preventing consumer confusion and
those underlying the first sale rule.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29, 37.
63. KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 122 (quoting Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v.
Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1997)).
64. KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 121-22.
65. Id. at 122.
66. See id.
67. See id at 121-23 (stating that the commercial justification for the defendant's use of
the term and the strength of the mark might also be relevant considerations).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 9-14; infra Part VI.
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IV. FREE-RIDERS AND THE BALANCE OF INCENTIVES AND ACCESS
The free-rider rationale for exclusive intellectual property rights
has its roots in natural law, Lockean labor theory, the role of courts of
equity in society, and the concept of unjust enrichment. 6 9 The most
common articulation suggests that a person who profits from
another's investment is misappropriating to themselves the benefits of
another's labor, e.g., "One man may not reap where another has sown,
nor gather where another has strewn."70 A somewhat different focus
is suggested by an alternative formulation that ignores the labor and
investment of the person creating intellectual property if the
appropriator made additional and substantial investments of his or her
OWHM.71
The misappropriation view is common in all areas of intellectual
property law. Courts recognize that innovation will be discouraged if
competitors are allowed to free-ride on patented inventionS72 and that
the patent licensing system prevents other companies from free-riding
on others' inventions.73 Copyright law provides a benefit to authors
by ensuring that copiers will not free-ride on their investments in
creativity.74 One of the purposes of copyright law is to ensure that
authors will not have to share their profits with free-riders. In
trademark law, infringement,76 initial interest confusion,77 post-sale
confusion,7 8  dilution,79  cybersquatting,80  and false endorsement
69. See Wendy J. Gordon, Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 167 (1992).
70. J. I. Case Plow Works v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 155 N.W. 128, 134 (Wis.
1915).
71. See Nat'1 Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) and the
discussion of this case infra.
72. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1249 (W.D.
Wash. 1999), vacated, Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
73. Shapiro v. Gen. Motors Corp., 472 F. Supp. 636, 645 (D.C. Md. 1979).
74. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
75. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 211 F.3d
21, 29 (2d Cir. 2000).
76. See, e.g., Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2006)
(characterizing an ordinary infringement claim as "one in which the claimant asserts that the
infringer is diverting the claimant's customers and free-riding on the claimant's reputation and
goodwill").
77. See, e.g., Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. Check Point Software Technologies, Inc., 269
F.3d 270, 294-95 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d
254, 260 (2nd Cir. 1987) ("Without initial interest protection, an infringer could use an
established mark to create confusion as to a product's source thereby receiving a 'free-ride on
the goodwill' of the established mark.").
78. See, e.g., Gucci America, Inc. v. Daffy's Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cit. 2003)
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claims8 1  are all justified by the prevention of free-riding. The
trademark owner has invested resources to identify itself and certain
characteristics and qualities of its products with a mark. Another
supplier using that mark not only deceives consumers about the
source of the goods but also reaps the benefits of the other's
investment without having obtained permission or paid for the
privilege. Whether in patent, copyright, or trademark law, the free-
rider is a "thief" who is "stealing" from the creator.82
An alternative, though related, perspective views the free-rider as
someone who is unjustly enriched because he has earned a return
based on another's work without having made substantial investments
of her own. This perspective steps back from the interest in
compensating the creator for his labor. The plaintiff in National
Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc.8 3 had, at great expense, created a
professional men's basketball league (the NBA) and produced a series
of basketball games. The defendant, Motorola, collected the scores of
games in progress and supplied them to its subscribers, who received
the data on hand-held pagers.8 4 Although Motorola had appropriated
(characterizing the plaintiffs post-sale confusion claim as an argument that the defendant's
customers are "posing as true Gucci wearers, free-riding on Gucci exclusivity at a Daffy's
price").
79. See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002)
(stating that in dilution cases the issue at stake is "protection from an appropriation of or free-
riding on the investment" in the trademark (quoting I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163
F.3d 27, 50 (1st Cir. 1998)).
80. See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Services, Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 945 (9th Cir.
2002).
If a rogue company adopts as its domain name a protected trademark and
proceeds to sell goods similar to those offered by the trademark owner, it
necessarily free-rides on the trademark owner's goodwill, and that rogue
company benefits from increasing initial interest confusion as consumers exercise
lower levels of care in making their purchasing decisions.
Id
81. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publishing, 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th
Cir. 1992) ("Throughout the development of trademark law, the purpose of trademarks remained
constant and limited: Identification of the manufacturer or sponsor of a good or the provider of a
service. And the wrong protected against was traditionally equally limited: Preventing producers
from free-riding on their rivals' marks."). See also Board of Supervisors for Louisiana State
University Agricultural and Mechanical College v. Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d 465, 483 (5th Cir.
2008) (concluding that the defendant's conduct was "designed to create the illusion of affiliation
with the Universities and essentially obtain a 'free-ride' by profiting from confusion among the
fans of the Universities' football teams who desire to show support for and affiliation with those
teams").
82. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2003) (equating misappropriation
with free-riding, stealing, and theft).
83. National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
84. Id at 843-44.
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valuable, time-sensitive information from the NBA," Motorola was
not "in any sense free-riding."8 6 Motorola's business required the
expense of collecting, assembling, and transmitting the information.8 7
Motorola had its own network and expended its own resources, 88 so it
was not free-riding on the NBA's labors or investments. Had
Motorola copied the information from data already collected and
assembled and transmitted by the NBA, that would have been another
story.
Looking at this alternative perspective from a justice perspective,
apparently the fact that the other person has him or herself invested
time, money, or energy to benefit from another's creative activity
rectifies the moral imbalance, despite the lack of compensation to the
creator. Some courts have looked at the investment of the alleged
free-rider in a relative way: "Where the infringement is small in
relation to the new work created, the fair user is profiting largely from
his own creative efforts rather than free-riding on another's work."90
If the riding is expensive, it is not "free" riding.
It is only a short step from the justice-based view of free-riding
to the competition and incentives approach of intellectual property
economics. These are the stories most often told in the intellectual
property context. A publisher who reprints another's book without
compensating the creator can underprice the publisher who pays the
author royalties and incurs editorial costs, take some or all of the
business from that publisher without having incurred comparable
costs, make a profit, and deprive both the author and the first
publisher of the reward and the incentive to engage in the creative
work in the first place.9' The same story can be told for inventors and
those who free-ride on their inventions. If the intellectual property
information embodied in the book or invention is never created,
consumers are deprived of those advances in knowledge and the
useful arts. A competitor who affixes another supplier's trademark to
85. Id. at 853.




90. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302, 307-08 n.6 (9th Cir.
1992).
91. See, e.g., Steven Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 281-82 (1970).
92. See, e.g., Yusing Ko, An Economic Analysis ofBiotechnology Patent Protection, 102
YALE L.J. 777, 791 (1992).
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her own goods avoids the costs of making the source indicator a
familiar reference for consumers, diverts trade from the mark owner
to herself, and deprives the supplier of the reward from having made
the investment and the incentive to spread to consumers information
about the source and characteristics of his goods.93
Introducing the economic considerations necessarily leads to the
question of whether the competition resulting from free-riding in a
particular case improperly interferes with incentives. This leads some
courts in misappropriation cases to find that there is improper free-
riding only when the parties compete.94 A competitor's use of
another's creation gives the competitor a special advantage in that
competition because, having avoided the expense of creation, it can
sell at a lower price.95 This imbalance in competitive ability removes
the incentive to engage in creative activity. 96 While other courts do
not consider these factors in misappropriation cases, 97 there is no
doubt that these economic considerations dominate the Supreme
Court's view of intellectual property law generally.
Intellectual property law sometimes views free-riding as
sometimes inappropriate and sometimes not. Free-riding after the
expiration of the time limited period for exclusive patent98 and
copyright privileges 99 are obvious examples of acceptable free-riding.
Permissive free-riding may be most explicit in copyright law, where
the statutory fair use doctrine focuses on the effect of the alleged
93. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECoN. 265, 270 (1987).
94. See, e.g., Dresser-Rand Co. v. Virtual Automation Inc., 361 F.3d 831, 839 (5th Cir.
2004).
The elements of a cause of action for unfair competition by misappropriation in
Texas are: "(i) the creation of plaintiffs product through extensive time, labor,
skill and money, (ii) the defendant's use of that product in competition with the
plaintiff, thereby gaining a special advantage in that competition (i.e., a 'free-
ride') because defendant is burdened with little or none of the expense incurred
by the plaintiff, and (iii) commercial damage to the plaintiff." United States
Sporting Prods., Inc. v. Johnny Stewart Game Calls, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 214, 218
(Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
Id. See also U.S. Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028,
1034-40 (3d Cir. 1984).
95. Dresser-Rand Co., 361 F.3d at 839.
96. See U.S. Golf Ass'n, 749 F.2d at 1034-40 (discussing the relationship between
competition and incentives where there is free-riding).
97. See, e.g., Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 439 N.E.2d 526, 537 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982), aff'd, 456 N.E.2d 84 (1983).
98. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
99. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305 (2006).
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infringer's conduct on the copyright holder's market. 00 In copyright
law, authors have no exclusive rights to facts' 1  and ideas' 02 they
disclosed to the public. Dissenting in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises,0 3 Justice Brennan observed:
The urge to compensate for subsequent use of information and
ideas is perhaps understandable. An inequity seems to lurk in the
idea that much of the fruit of the historian's labor may be used
without compensation. This, however, is not some unforeseen
byproduct of a statutory scheme intended primarily to ensure a
return for works of the imagination. Congress made the affirmative
choice that the copyright laws should apply in this way ... The
copyright laws serve as the "engine of free expression" . . . only
when the statutory monopoly does not choke off multifarious
indirect uses and consequent broad dissemination of information
and ideas. To ensure the progress of arts and sciences and the
integrity of First Amendment values, ideas and information must
not be freighted with claims of proprietary right. 104
Patent law does not have a similar fair use provision. Professors
Frischmann and Lemley argue, however, that because of a patent's
limited term, the overwhelming majority of social benefit associated
with inventions occurs after the exclusive rights of the inventors have
expired.'0o
Recognizing the benefits from permitting free access to
intellectual property creation does not inevitably lead to permitting
more free-riding. The focus on incentives to create may result in an
expansion of exclusive rights. For instance, in the context of patent
law, the Supreme Court justified the doctrine of equivalents by
reference to the beneficial incentive effects of broadening the scope of
patent rights.10 6 The Supreme Court concluded that the additional
100. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
101. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979-80 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that factual information is in the public domain), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1 (1980).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) states "In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work."
103. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 589-90 (1985).
104. Id (internal citations omitted).
105. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 257, 291
(2007).
106. The doctrine of equivalents in patent law is based in part on the increased incentives
effects of allowing inventors exclusive rights beyond the apparent literal scope of their patent
claims. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731-32
(2002) (applying the doctrine of equivalents and recognizing that "[tihe language in the patent
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benefit associated with the expansion of rights under the doctrine of
equivalents outweighed the reduction in benefits associated with free
access.10 7  The Court recognized that adopting the doctrine of
equivalents might deter other inventors from legitimate activities that
are beyond the scope of the claims or trap people who mistakenly buy
products covered by the broadly interpreted claim.os Yet, from the
Court's perspective, the increase in valuable inventive activity from
additional incentives created by broad interpretation outweighed the
benefits from free access that would result from a narrower literal
infringement only rule. 109
Similarly, free-riding is permitted in trademark law. Consumers
are permitted freely to use suppliers' trademarks when searching for
goods; they may ask "Where is the Tylenol?" in a drug store without
paying or asking permission from McNeil-PPC, Inc., its producer.
Consumers need not pay for the benefits they obtain even if they
reject the trademarked goods.110 Competitors may freely use
competitors' trademarks in comparative advertising. The Ninth
claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or describe with complete precision the
range of its novelty."). The Supreme Court concluded that the additional benefit associated with
this expansion of rights outweighed the reduction in benefits associated with free access. Id.
107. Id. at 732.
108. Id. ("If competitors cannot be certain about a patent's extent, they may be deterred
from engaging in legitimate manufactures outside its limits, or they may invest by mistake in
competing products that the patent secures. In addition the uncertainty may lead to wasteful
litigation between competitors, suits that a rule of literalism might avoid.").
109. Id. at 732 ("Each time the Court has considered the doctrine [of equivalents], it has
acknowledged this uncertainty as the price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation,
and it has affirmed the doctrine over dissents that urged a more certain rule."). The Court also
said:
If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be
greatly diminished. Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements
could defeat the patent, and its value to inventors could be destroyed by simple
acts of copying. For this reason, the clearest rule of patent interpretation,
literalism, may conserve judicial resources but is not necessarily the most
efficient rule. The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead
embraces all equivalents to the claims described.
Id. at 731-32. Contemporary scholars similarly focus on the incremental incentive effects of
patent rules. See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer and Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and
Patent Claim Scope. A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEo. L.J. 1947,
1953 (2005) (offering a utilitarian analysis of the doctrine of equivalents based on the view that
the doctrine of equivalents allows inventors to avoid the costs of refining and revising their
patent claims during patent prosecution). Their theory leads to a conclusion that "[a] socially
optimal patent policy should balance refinement cost savings and innovation incentives created
by the DOE against the harm to competition and rent-seeking costs created by the doctrine." Id.
110. David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
22, 28-35 (2006) (discussing how people other than the mark owner are permitted to use
trademarks without the owner's permission).
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Circuit noted with approval the Federal Trade Commission's position
on comparative advertising, in Sony Computer Entertainment
America, Inc. v. Bleem, LLC."' The Federal Trade Commission had
noted the social utility of comparative advertising as "a source of
important information to consumers [that] assists them in making
rational purchase decisions. Comparative advertising encourages
product improvement and innovation, and can lead to lower prices in
the marketplace."ll 2 Comparative advertisements are permitted even
though "the advertiser reaps the benefit of 'the product recognition
engendered by the owner's popularization, though expensive
advertising, of the mark."" 13 Scholars have observed that "[I]f the
law does not prevent it, free-riding will eventually destroy the
information capital embodied in a trademark, and the prospect of free-
riding may therefore eliminate the incentive to develop a valuable
trademark in the first place."" 4 But courts have recognized that when
the general rule enforcing trademark rights "impede[s] rather than
promote[s] competition and consumer welfare, an exception should
be recognized.""' The issue, then, is whether a particular set of
factual circumstances is one in which free-riding is desirable.116
In Ty v. Perryman,"7 Judge Posner considered the free-riding
argument in a case where the first sale rule was applicable to a
dilution case. An expansive concept of dilution, he observed, would
prohibit anyone from free-riding on the aura of a famous mark, such
as Tiffany & Co., and the famous jewelry store "will realize the full
benefits of the investment rather than sharing those benefits with
others-and as a result the amount of investing in creating a prestigious
name will rise.""" In comparison, one who resells the very product to
which the trademark is attached, is not free-riding to any significant
111. Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir.
2000). See also August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995).
112. Sony, 214 F.3d at 1027 (quoting 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(c) (1980)).
113. Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenUcom, Inc., 293 F.Supp.2d 734, 761 (E.D. Mich. 2003)
(quoting Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 n. 2 (9th Cir.1979)).
114. Landes & Posner, supra note 93, at 270.
115. Peaceable Planet, Inc. v. Ty, Inc., 362 F.3d 986, 990 (7th Cir. 2004).
116. See WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass'n, 926 F.2d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Just how,
when and where the law should protect investments in 'intangible' benefits or goods is a matter
that legislators typically debate, embodying the results in specific statutes, or that common law
courts, carefully weighing relevant competing interests, gradually work out over time.").
117. Ty v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2002).
118. Id. Others have questioned whether the dilution theory as applied to famous marks
provides any additional incentive to invest in trademarks. See David W. Barnes, Congestible
Intellectual Property and Impure Public Goods, 10 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. (forthcoming
2011).
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extent:
To say she was [free-riding] would amount to saying that if a used
car dealer truthfully advertised that it sold Toyotas, or if a muffler
manufacturer truthfully advertised that it specialized in making
mufflers for installation in Toyotas, Toyota would have a claim of
trademark infringement. Of course there can be no aftermarket
without an original market, and in that sense, sellers in a
trademarked good's aftermarket are free-riding on the trademark.
But in that attenuated sense of free-riding, almost everyone in
business is free-riding." 9
The law makes no attempt to internalize to every creator of
information all of the external benefits of his or her work,12 0 explicitly
allowing free-riding when it is desirable as a policy matter.
In intellectual property scholarship, the dominant economic
tropes, public goods theory and its analog,12 1 externalities or spillover
theory, similarly focus on the need to prevent free-riding for the
ultimate purpose of establishing incentives to create. Public goods
theory recognizes the desirability of making intellectual property
information available to additional consumers at a price that reflects
the additional costs of doing so (approximately zero).122 It also
119. Ty, 306 F.3d at 512.
120. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 105 (applying externalities theory to copyright
and patent law); Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright Law:
Theory and Application, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2005) (applying the theory of externalities to
copyright law); Alina Ng, Copyright's Empire: Why the Law Matters, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REv. 337 (2007) (using an externalities approach to develop an institutional and technological
analysis of copyright); David W. Barnes, Trademark Externalities, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1
(2007) (applying externalities theory to trademark law).
121. See id. at 24 (2007) (discussing the connection between public goods theory and
externalities theory).
122. See Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Property, and the Right to Deny, 68 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 675, 698 (1993).
Where effective, exclusionary rights govern public goods, a positive price to each
user, and perhaps for each use, will exceed the zero marginal cost associated with
additional users or uses. Information, apart from the tangible media used to carry
it, is the quintessential public good. Thus, the quasi-property right granted by
copyright over creations and expressions prevents the efficient distribution of
access to copyrighted works.
Id.
While most private goods are produced under conditions of increasing or
constant marginal cost, so that significant increments of resources are consumed
in serving additional customers, pure public goods are costless to reproduce and
distribute. The benefits of increased use of pure public goods will therefore
always outweigh the cost. Under conditions of Pareto optimality, where price
equals marginal cost, use of pure public goods would be free. Producers of public
goods, however, must charge some price to cover their costs, or they will not
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recognizes the necessity of a price sufficient to encourage people to
produce the information, enough to provide incentives, and the
challenge of balancing between these interests.12 3 Spillover theory
recognizes the desirability and inevitability of allowing some people
to benefit from other creative work without paying. 12 4  It also
recognizes the need to provide sufficient returns to cover the creator's
average costs (including a normal economic profit)-any additional
revenue is immaterial to the creator's incentives. 125 There is a trade-
produce. Charging a price greater than marginal cost will prevent many who
could pay the marginal cost from sharing the benefits of the good. While
nonappropriability will lead to underproduction, the attempt to charge a price
exceeding marginal cost of use also will cause welfare losses through suboptimal
utilization of whatever public goods are produced. Legal protection for producers
may reduce the risk of underproduction, but it will exacerbate underutilization.
Alternatively, the government can hold the price down to marginal cost either by
subsidizing private firms or by producing the public good itself
John F. Barry III, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10B-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
1307, 1325 (1981) (internal citations omitted).
123. See James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination
and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2007, 2028 (2000) (discussing the conflict
between marginal cost pricing and monopoly pricing in intellectual property generally).
Professor Glynn Lunney described this problem in the context of copyright law:
As economists have recognized, using a system of exclusive rights, such as
copyright, to ensure an appropriate supply of a public good through private
markets creates a Catch-22 situation. In the absence of copyright, if markets were
perfectly competitive, there would be no economic incentive to produce works of
authorship. When a new work was introduced, competitors would instantly copy
it, price would be driven to the marginal cost of additional copies, and the work's
author would receive no economic profit or rent to cover her initial authorship
costs. Given the absence of an economic incentive to produce such works, too
few works would be created. In the absence of copyright, perfectly competitive
private markets would not therefore ensure an optimal allocation of resources. On
the other hand, if we grant the author a legal right to prohibit unauthorized
copying, thereby enabling her to set a price for her copies somewhat above their
marginal cost, then the author will earn some economic rent and have a
corresponding incentive to create the work. However, absent an ability to price
discriminate perfectly, pricing above marginal cost will deny some consumers
access to the work, creating a deadweight welfare loss. Because of this
deadweight loss, private markets for copyrighted works will also fail to achieve a
Pareto optimal allocation of resources.
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REv. 975, 994-
95 (2002) (internal citations omitted). See also John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies,
88 TEx. L. REv. 505, 517 (2010) (discussing the issue in the context of patent law); Barnes,
supra note I10, at 40 (discussing the issue in the context of trademark law).
124. Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 105, at 281-82 (2007) (discussing the benefits of
refusing to internalize all external benefits resulting from the production of intellectual property
information).
125. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright Law: Theory
and Application, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 14 (2005); and Mark A. Lemley, Property,
Intellectual Property, and Free-riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1032, 1054-57 (2005).
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off between free-riding (access at low or no cost) and incentives.12 6
This tradeoff is explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in
patent, copyright, and trademark law. While intellectual property law
is designed to encourage the supply of information about how to
express ideas, novel and non-obvious processes, materials, and
machines, and the sources and characteristics of goods, the ultimate
goal is broad public access to information. 12 7 In a recent trademark
case, the Supreme Court recognized the significance of promoting
competition as a concern of trademark law. 128 If the first sale rule
promotes competition, then the advantages of permitting free-riding
in any particular case could be weighed against the harms, as the
Court suggested could be done under the trademark fair use rule.
Promoting competition has justified other trademark rules. The
rule denying protection to functional characteristics of products
promotes competition. The requirement of non-functionality
"prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by
protecting a firm's reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate
competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product
feature." 1 2 9 Tying free-riding to incentives greatly complicates a
court's analysis. It requires a comparison of the benefits to be
obtained from the incentive effect of exclusive rights and the benefits
to be gained by allowing others to use the intellectual property
126. See Frischmann, supra note 13, at 813 n.49 ("Of course, the need to balance
incentives and access is nothing new and has been a long-standing feature of intellectual
property scholarship in general and the economic analysis of intellectual property in
particular.").
127. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("Creative
work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause
of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts."); Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant
is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended
to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a
special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after
the limited period of exclusive control has expired.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 429. The Court in Sony stated that:
Congress must consider . . . two questions: First, how much will the legislation
stimulate the producer and so benefit the public, and, second, how much will the
monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive
rights, under the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public
that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 n. 10 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909)).
128. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 (2004).
129. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).
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information as they have done.
V. THE FREE-RIDER RATIONALE IN A u-ToMOTIvE GOLD INC. V.
VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA
Free-riding and the first sale rule met, apparently for the first
time, in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case Au-Tomotive Gold
Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.130 Volkswagen ("VW") produced
VW badges and sold them to the public. The badge is the trademark
symbol ordinarily used as a replacement for the badge found on the
hood or trunk of a Volkswagen vehicle.13 1 Au-Tomotive Gold ["Auto
Gold"] removed the prongs used to hold the badges to the hood or
trunk, in some cases gold-plated them, mounted them on license plate
frames, and sold them with labels that explained that the plates were
neither produced nor sponsored by Volkswagen. 3 2 When Auto Gold
sought a declaratory judgment that its activities constituted neither
trademark infringement nor trademark dilution, VW counterclaimed,
alleging, inter alia, trademark infringement.133 Auto Gold asserted the
first sale defense because it had acquired the badges from a
Volkswagen dealer1 34 and disclaimed in its packaging any association
with Volkswagen.1 35 The court held that the first sale rule did not
provide a defense for Auto Gold.'36
The Ninth Circuit did not base its holding on a finding that
purchasers of the plates would be confused as to the origin of the
plates, but rather on "post-sale" or "post-purchase" confusion. 37
Post-purchase confusion was likely to arise when observers who saw
the plates on purchasers' cars believed that VW had supplied or
authorized the supply of those plates.138 Auto Gold argued that the
free-riding present in other post-purchase confusion cases was not
present in its case because it had "paid the price asked by the
trademark owner for the 'ride,"' asserting the first sale defense.139
The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument without analysis of the
130. Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th
Cir. 2010).





136. Id at 1134.
137. Id. at 1136.
138. Id.atll38.
139. Id.
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balancing inherent in the free-riding argument. 14 0 It concluded that
the likelihood of confusion is central to trademark infringement
claims1 4 1 and "if a producer profits from a trademark because of post-
purchase confusion about the product's origin, the producer is, to that
degree, a free-rider." Because there is confusion, the first sale rule is
not a defense. 142 It would seem that the first sale rule would only be a
defense if there were no confusion, but in that case, the defendant
would not need a defense. 143
The Ninth Circuit discussed two lines of relevant cases: those
applying the first sale rule and those where confusion was only likely
post-purchase. While the first sale rule applies in a variety of other
contexts,144 the court discussed a Supreme Court case and two prior
Ninth Circuit cases involving the repackaging or resale of the
trademark owner's goods in which the authors "relied entirely on the
possibility of confusion among non-purchasers."l 4 5 It also discussed
several federal district court opinions where the trademark owner's
goods were used as components of new products. From these cases,
the court concluded that the central focus was on whether the
purchaser would be confused. 146
A. The First Sale Cases
The Ninth Circuit could have interpreted the Supreme Court first
sale case as focused on something other than the likelihood of
confusion. Prestonettes, Inc., v. Coty,147 involved a defendant who
repackaged the plaintiffs perfumes into smaller bottles and added
ingredients to the plaintiffs toilet powders and put them in new
containers.148 The Court assumed that the modified articles would be
resold with labels that identified the components referring to the
trademark of the plaintiff while clearly indicating that the defendant
140. See Au-Tomotive Gold, 603 F.3d at 1133.
141. Id. at 1138.
142. Id. at 1134.
143. This conclusion is reminiscent of Justice Souter's criticism of the Ninth Circuit's
argument in another trademark case dealing with defenses, KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 120 (2004). See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 16-2 1.
145. Au-Tomotive Gold, 603 F.3d at 1137 (noting that post-purchase confusion "may be no
less injurious to the trademark owner's reputation than confusion on the part of the purchaser at
the time of sale." (quoting Karl Storz Endoscopy-America, Inc. v. Surgical Tech., Inc., 285 F.3d
848, 854 (9th Cir. 2003)).
146. Au-Tomotive Gold, 603 F.3d at 1137.
147. Prestonettes, Inc., v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924).
148. Id. at 366-67.
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rather than the plaintiff was the source of the repackaged goods. 149
Without referring to the first sale rule by name, Justice Holmes stated
"The defendant of course by virtue of its ownership had a right to
compound or change what it bought, to divide either the original or
the modified product, and to sell it so divided."150 Prestonnettes was
permitted to state on its labels that the component parts were from
Coty, giving Coty's name for the perfume or toilet powder, as long as
it included words indicating that the repackaged goods came from
"Prestonettes, Inc., not connected with Coty" and were independently
repackaged in New York.' 51 The Ninth Circuit could as easily have
concluded that Prestonnettes created an absolute defense based on the
first sale rule for goods resold with truthful disclosures about
modifications that had been made and who had made them.
Neither of its own prior opinions provides much support for the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Au-Tomotive Gold. The first, Sebastian
Intern., Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp. ,152 involved the simple
resale, without modification, of the plaintiffs goods containing the
collective mark originally applied by the plaintiff.15 3 Discussing the
first sale rule, the Ninth Circuit had stated:
The "first sale" rule is not rendered inapplicable merely because
consumers erroneously believe the reseller is affiliated with or
authorized by the producer. It is the essence of the "first sale"
doctrine that a purchaser who does no more than stock, display,
and resell a producer's product under the producer's trademark
violates no right conferred upon the producer by the Lanham
Act. 154
Sebastian does not apply directly to the facts of Au-Tomotive Gold
because Auto Gold did more than simply stock, display, and resell.
Auto Gold modified VW's goods by affixing them to a license plate
149. Id. at 367.
150. Id. at 368.
151. Id. at 367. The Court offered the following example: "If a man bought a barrel of a
certain flour, or a demijohn of Old Crow whisky, he certainly could sell the flour in smaller
packages or in former days could have sold the whisky in bottles, and tell what it was, if he
stated that he did the dividing up or the bottling." Id. at 369.
152. Sebastian Intern., Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1995).
153. Id. at 1074. The court stated that the first sale doctrine applies equally to trademarks
and collective marks. Id. at 1075 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1054, which states that "collective . . .
marks . . . shall be registrable under this chapter, in the same manner and with the same effect as
are trademarks . . . and when registered they shall be entitled to the protection provided in this
chapter in the case of trade-marks. . . .").
154. Sebastian, 53 F.3d at 1076.
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to create a new product.' 55 But the Sebastian decision does suggest
that some confusion is acceptable and consistent with "the essence of
the 'first sale' doctrine." 5 6 In addition, the Sebastian opinion adheres
to the traditional views of the first sale rule as providing a "sensible
and stable accommodation between strong and potentially conflicting
forces," 5 7 the interest of consumers and trademark owners in
guaranteeing the reliability of source-indicators, and the public
interest in competition and limiting suppliers' power to control the
resale of their products.s15
The second case, Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco Inc., 159 involved
a failure of the defendant to indicate that it had repackaged the goods
by removing them from their original containers. 160 The opinion
recognized that confusion ordinarily did not arise "when a genuine
article bearing a true mark is sold"' 6 1 and focused on the repackaging
notice exception as necessary to prevent confusion.16 2 The failure to
provide the notice was sufficient for the appellate court to reverse the
district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs claim.163 Enesco focused on
the potential for confusion when there is a first sale but no
repackaging notice.164 Enesco provides no guidance about how to
balance the interest in competition and limiting suppliers' power to
control resale identified in Sebastian. Nor did Enesco involve any
material alternation in the original good itself.
The three federal district court opinions from other jurisdictions
are more on point because they involve incorporating the trademarked
155. Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th
Cir. 2010).
156. Sebastian, 53 F.3d at 1076.
157. Id. at 1075.
158. Id., stating:
By guaranteeing that a product will be identified with its producer, it serves the
legitimate purposes of trademark law-the producer gains the good will associated
with the quality of its product, and the consumer gets exactly what the consumer
bargains for, the genuine product of the particular producer. On the other hand,
the "first sale" rule preserves an area for competition by limiting the producer's
power to control the resale of its product. The "first sale" doctrine has proven to
be a reliable and useful guide in an area in which a high volume of business-
driven litigation must be expected.
159. Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco Inc., 146 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1998).
160. Id. at 1084-85.
161. Id. at 1085 (quoting NEC Elecs v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 509 (9th Cir.
1987) (citing Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1924)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1087.
164. See id. at 1086.
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good into another product, as in Au-Tomotive Gold, but they only
required proper labeling. The first case, Alexander Binzel Corp. v. Nu-
Techsys Corp.,' 65 relied on a Fifth Circuit opinion' 66 where the court
stated "If [the defendant] can buy component parts from [the plaintiff]
and assemble them into a product at a price that is competitive with
another of [the plaintiffs] products, that competition serves the public
interest."' 67 The court in Alexander Binzel held that the defendant had
done all that was required of them to diminish consumer confusion by
packing the product with its own name and label, 16 8 citing the familiar
rational that the defendant had paid the price the trademark owner
asked and the trademark owner had profited from the sale.169 In the
second case, Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Dad's Kid
Corp.,170 the defendant manufactured three-dimensional images from
baseball cards supplied by the plaintiffs licensees.171 The court cited
and quoted Alexander Binzel1 7 2 and found that because of the proper
labeling identifying the manufacturer and disclaiming any
relationship with the trademark owner, there was no likelihood of
confusion. 1 In the third case, Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. American
Handbags, Inc.,17 4 the defendant made ladies handbags from the
165. Alexander Binzel Corp. v. Nu-Techsys Corp., 785 F. Supp. 719, 723 (N.D. Ill., 1992).
The defendant in Nu-Techsys purchased handles from the plaintiff, did not remove the
plaintiffs trademarks, and attached the handles to items of its own manufacture. The court
stated that requiring the defendant to remove the trademark would produce an "absurd result."
Id.
166. Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding no Lanham Act
violation). The defendant in Roho had purchased the cushions from the plaintiff, removed the
plaintiffs trademarks, and attached the cushions to one another with glue and grommets.
167. Alexander Binzel Corp., 785 F. Supp. at 723 (quoting Roho, 902 F.2d at 361).
168. Alexander Binzel, 785 F. Supp. at 724.
169. Id.
170. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Dad's Kid Corp., 806 F. Supp. 458
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
171. Id. at 459. The defendant, Dad's Kid, made and sold Tri-Cards, which are displayed
in plastic frames. Its product was produced from three authentic licensed baseball cards
originally made by MLBPA's licensees (i.e., Fleer, Upper Deck, etc.). Id.
Leaving one card intact, Dad's Kid cuts the player's total figure with bat, etc.
from each of the two remaining cards, and then slightly staggers those images
above the player's image on the intact card, giving a 3-D effect. The reverse side
of each Tri-Card is simply the reverse side of the original licensed card, bearing
the player photograph, player information, and the trademarks and logos of the
licensed manufacturer, Major League Baseball and the MLBPA.
Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 460.
174. Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. American Handbags, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 255 (D.C.N.Y.
1960).
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plaintiffs towels, which were embedded with the plaintiffs
trademark.17 5 Citing and quoting Prestonnettes, 176 the court focused
on the likelihood of confusion, holding that a proper notice that the
manufacturer of the handbag was not associated with Scarves by Vera
was required.177 The court observed, however, that
the defendant is still entitled to inform consumers by use of
plaintiff s name and trademark that the towel of which the handbag
is made is the product of Scarves by Vera. The result is, of course,
that defendant will get some advantage from the trademark. This,
however, is wholly permissible so long as plaintiff is not identified
with the manufacture of the handbag. All plaintiff is entitled to is
full disclosure. 178
These cases recognize the remanufacturers' right to free-ride on the
efforts of the original manufacturer and focus on the labeling
necessary to accomplish the dual objectives of preventing confusion
and promoting competition.
B. The Post-Purchase Confusion Cases
After discussing cases applying the first sale rule, the Ninth
Circuit had to make the connection to cases where purchasers of
remanufactured goods were not confused. In Au-Tomotive Gold, the
court discussed this second line of cases to illustrate its history of
recognizing a cause of action in post-sale confusion cases. These are
cases where someone other than the direct purchaser of the goods sold
by the remanufacturer or reconditioner of the goods is likely to be
confused about the source of the product. Neither of these cases
directly addressed the first sale doctrine,1 79 so there will remain a
final and crucial link in their analysis--deciding whether the first sale
rule should apply to the more attenuated post-sale confusion context.
Neither case discussed the rationale for finding actionable confusion
in these post-sale cases. Both cases nicely illustrate the anti-
competitive implications of finding infringement when the purchaser
175. Id. at 256.
176. Id at 258 (quoting Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) ("A trade-
mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner's good will
against the sale of another's product as his. * * * When the mark is used in a way that does not
deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the
truth. It is not taboo.").
177. Scarves by Vera, Inc., 188 F. Supp. at 258.
178. Id. at 258 (citing Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130 (1941)).
179. See Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 603 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir
2010).
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is not the person confused.
These two post-purchase confusion cases are Champion Spark
Plug-type cases where the defendant repaired or reconditioned the
plaintiffs product and then used the plaintiffs mark in reselling
them. Champion Spark Plug-type cases were examined above in Part
11,180 as part of the discussion of the limits on the first sale doctrine
and again in this part, 18 when discussing the right of a person to use
another's trademarked goods with the trademark attached when
producing and selling another good. A reseller has the right to resell
the original product with the original trademark attached, as long as
he tells the truth about the origin of the repaired goods and about his
responsibility for any repairs.182 The Supreme Court's affirming
opinion in Champion Spark Plugsl83 identified another possible
exception, one that did not arise in the Champion Spark Plug case
itself. The Court imagined a situation where the repair was "so
extensive or so basic that it would be a misnomer to call the article by
its original name, even though the words 'used' or 'repaired' were
added."1 84 The Ninth Circuit's post-purchase confusion cases fit this
description. The policy reasons underlying prohibition of this conduct
under the post-sale confusion rubric differ greatly from those
applicable to the Au-Tomotive Gold context.
Both of the cases cited by the Ninth Circuit in Au-Tomotive Gold
involved such extensive reconstruction that returning the good to its
purchaser with the original trademark affixed might confuse people
other than that purchaser. Karl Storz Endoscopy America, Inc. v.
Surgical Technologies, Inc. 18 involved endoscopes sent for repair by
hospitals. Some were so extensively rebuilt that all the essential parts
were new and only the base of the machine, which bore the
trademark, remained.18 6 In Karl Storz, the court stated that an
infringement claim may be establish by showing "confusion on the
part of someone other than the purchaser who, for example, simply
sees the item after it has been purchased."' In Karl Storz, the people
180. See text accompanying notes 21-22.
181. See text accompanying note 171.
182. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 156 F.2d 488, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1946), affd, 331
U.S. 125 (1947).
183. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
184. Id. at 129.
185. Karl Storz Endoscopy America, Inc. v. Surgical Technologies, Inc., 285 F.3d 848,
855 (9th Cir. 2002).
186. Id. at 856.
187. Id. at 854.
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likely to be confused were the doctors using the repaired machines."I
Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc. v. Michel Co.'89 barred the repairer from
using the Rolex mark in any way on the extensively repaired
watches.190 In Rolex Watch, the people likely to be confused were
subsequent or downstream purchasers and people who simply looked
at the watch. 191
The policies underlying these rules reflect the interest in
protecting businesses and consumers. Champion Spark Plugs
recognized that free-riding would result from the advantage the
reseller obtained from retaining the original trademark as "wholly
permissible."l 9 2 Protecting businesses means that "the owner of the
trademark must have the energy and effort he expended in building
goodwill in his trademark protected from misappropriation."l 93
Consumers interests are fulfilled when the Lanham Act "protect[s] the
public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a
particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product
which it asks for and wants to get."' 94 However, the trademark owner
is protected from free-riding only "so long as the customer is getting a
product with the expected characteristics and so long as the goodwill
built up by the trademark owner is not eroded by being identified with
inferior quality."'195 Otherwise, "the Lanham Act does not prevent the
truthful use of trademarks, even if such use results in the enrichment
of others."l 9 6 To be based on this rationale, the post-purchase
confusion cases must identify harm to consumers or the trademark
owner other than simply loss of sales and other than the mere fact that
others free-ride on the owner's efforts.
A survey of cases and scholarly literature reveals a variety of
potential harms from post-purchase confusion. Many are associated
with goods that are imitations of luxury goods with restricted supply.
For instance, the purchaser of an original luxury handbag or watch
may be harmed "if the widespread existence of knockoffs decreases
188. Id. at 855 (stating that the evidence established that doctors effect hospitals'
purchasing decisions).
189. Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 1999).
190. Id. at 710.
191. Id at 707.
192. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130 (1947).
193. Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citing S. Rep. No. 79-1333 at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.S.C.A.N. 1274).
194. Id. at 1361 (quoting S. Rep. No. 79-1333 at 3 (1946)).
195. Nitro Leisure Products, 341 F.3d at 1362.
196. Id.
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the original's value by making the previously scarce
commonplace."l 9 7 These rationales are generally inapplicable in the
first sale context because the trademark owner controls the original
supply of goods to which its trademarks are affixed. Specifically in
Au-Tomotive Gold, in addition to the VW logo not being a limited-
availability luxury good, VW controlled the number of original VW
logos it sells.
A second set of harms identified with post-purchase confusion
involves real or perceived quality differences between original goods
and imitations that resemble the trademark owner's goods. If the
imitator's goods are of a lower quality and people other than the
purchaser are confused about the source, the trademark owner's
reputation for quality among those others may suffer."' This could
harm future sales by the trademark owner. Sometimes the concern for
quality has to do with the trademark owner's inability to control the
nature and quality of the other's goods.199 The problem is not
necessarily that the other's goods are of inferior quality, but that the
trademark owner "has a right to insist that its reputation not be
imperiled by another's actions."200
In the first sale context, this is unlikely to be a problem where
the goods are simply resold without modification because the
197. General Motors Corp. v. Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 358
(6th Cir. 2006) (listing harms generally and citing Hermes Intern. V. Lederer de Paris Fifth
Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2000). See also post-sale confusion cases identifying
concern with the manufacturer's reputation for rarity, Adidas America, Inc. v. Payless
Shoesource, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1058 (D. Or. 2008), or consumers interest in prestige,
Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 495 (S.D. Fla. 1986), or status, Hermes
Intern. v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2000), associated with
possessing a rare and expensive luxury good. Two related concerns are that consumers will buy
inexpensive imitations of luxury goods with the intent of deceiving their friends and other
people they encounter socially by passing them off as originals, see Mark P. McKenna, The
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1839, 1908-09 and n. 296
(2007), and that the original manufacturer might be harmed if the public fear that it might not be
getting the authentic trademarked good resulted in decreased sales, see General Motors Corp. v.
Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Hermes Intern.
V. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2000)).
198. General Motors Corp. v. Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 358
(6th Cir. 2006) (citing Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1244-45 (6th Cir.
1991)). See also Adidas America, Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1058-
59 (D. Or. 2008); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1987).
199. Wesley-Jessen Div. of Schering Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 698 F.2d 862, 867
(7th Cir. 1983) (citing Ideal Industries v. Gardner Bender, Inc., 612 F.2d 1018, 1026 (7th Cir.
1979)).
200. Id. (citing Processed Plastics Co. v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858 (7th
Cir. 1982)) (justifying a finding of irreparable harm even if the trademark owner could show no
loss of sales or market share).
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product's original quality remains. Where the original goods are
resold as part of a new product, such as the license plates in Au-
Tomotive Gold, the reputation for quality of the manufacturer of the
original good among non-purchasing consumers may be harmed if the
new product, the license plate frame to which the badge is affixed, is
of inferior quality. The abstract "right to control quality" similarly
applies in the new product cases.
Third, there are related claims that post-purchase confusion
might interfere with incentives to produce quality goods. Here again,
the arguments relate only to imitation goods, which is not an issue in
the first sale context. For instance, there might be harm to consumers
if trademark owners have a market driven incentive to decrease the
quality of their original goods because of competition from
inexpensive imitations. 20 1 Where a trademark owner has made a first
sale, it has been able to obtain its desired price from the initial
purchaser and faces no competitive pressure. With respect to new
products containing the trademarked item, such as license plates, the
trademark owner is at no cost disadvantage.
From this list of potential harms, the ones most applicable to the
first sale context are quality concerns. A manufacturer's reputation
among and future sales to other consumers might suffer if there is
post-purchase confusion as to the source of goods perceived as
inferior. Because the resold goods are not imitations and have been
sold for the full price desired by the trademark owner, the other sets
of rationales are inapplicable.
If the benefits of free-riding under some circumstances are
relevant to policy, some instances of potential confusion by third
parties might be tolerated. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition takes the position that some cases of potential confusion
to third persons do not present a significant enough threat to the sales
or good will of the trademark owner that they should be actionable. 20 2
201. See United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1353 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1987).
For, to the extent that trademarks provide a means for the public to distinguish
between manufacturers, they also provide incentives for manufacturers to provide
quality goods. Traffickers of these counterfeit goods, however, attract some
customers who would otherwise purchase the authentic goods. Trademark
holders' returns to their investments in quality are thereby reduced. This
reduction in profits may cause trademark holders to decrease their investments in
quality below what they would spend were there no counterfeit goods. This in
turn harms those consumers who wish to purchase higher quality goods.
Id.
202. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 cmt. b (1995).
To be actionable under this Section, the confusion must threaten the commercial
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The question once again is when is free-riding desirable and when
should it be prohibited.
C. The Free-Riding Analysis
Auto Gold argued that because it "paid the price asked by the
trademark owner for the 'ride,"' the element of free-riding
disappeared. 20 3 Applying the first sale and post-purchase confusion
cases to Auto Gold's conduct, the Ninth Circuit concluded that if a
reseller profits from use of another's trademark because of post-
purchase confusion about the product's origin, the reseller is a free-
rider.2 0 4 The court analogized to the Rolex case,20 s where the reseller
adequately explained to purchasers that the watches were refurbished
with non-Rolex parts.20 6 It concluded that because purchasers bought
the reconditioned watches in order to confuse others,20 7 the reseller is
free-riding despite having paid the price.208 Auto Gold was reaping
where VW had sewn and was gathering where VW had strewn.209
The fact of a reseller benefitting from the original
manufacturer's investments is not enough alone to condemn the
reseller. In Prestonnettes, Binzel, Dad's Kids Corp., and Scarves by
Vera, there was no possibility of post-sale confusion and that
distinguished those first sale cases from Au Tomotive Gold in the
interests of the owner of the mark, but it is not limited to the confusion of persons
doing business directly with the actor. An actor who sells goods bearing the
trademark of another to retailers or distributors for resale to consumers is subject
to liability despite the fact that the actor's immediate purchasers are not confused.
Similarly, although the purchaser of a counterfeit watch from a street vendor may
know that the watch is a counterfeit, the commercial interests of the trademark
owner may be threatened by the potential confusion of third persons. The good
will of the genuine product, for example, may be harmed among prospective
purchasers who examine the inferior counterfeit or who conclude that the genuine
product has now become too commonplace. On the other hand, not every
instance of potential confusion by third persons sufficiently threatens the
commercial interests of the trademark owner to constitute an infringement. The
confusion must present a significant risk to the sales or good will of the
trademark owner.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
203. Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th
Cir. 2010).
204. Id
205. Id at 1138-39 (discussing Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704,
707 (9th Cir. 1999)). See supra notes 183-185 and discussion in accompanying text.
206. Au-Tomotive Gold, 603 F.3d at 1139.
207. Id. ("purchasers buy the watches in order to make others think that they have bought a
true Rolex watch").
208. Id.
209. See supra text accompanying note 70.
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Ninth Circuit's view. 210 Because confusion is the keystone of
trademark law,211 the first sale rule does not apply in the Ninth Circuit
if there is any likelihood of confusion.
The procedural status of the court's ruling is that the first sale
rule is inapplicable to resellers whose conduct is likely to cause post-
sale confusion, even if they truthfully inform purchasers of the origin
of the goods they sell. The procedural effect of the court's ruling is
that a supplier of goods with component parts whose trademarks are
visible can benefit from the first sale rule only if defendants can
successfully rebut the trademark owner's case by showing that
confusion is not likely. The bottom line is that first sale is not an
affirmative defense in these cases.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the first sale rule and
trademark defenses generally is reminiscent of its holding in KP
Permanent,212 discussed in Part II, above. The Ninth Circuit had held
that the defendant could only benefit from the classic fair use defense
if there is no likelihood of confusion resulting from its descriptive use
of the plaintiffs mark.213 The court stated that "there can be no fair
use if there is a likelihood of confusion."214 Rejecting this argument
in the Supreme Court's KP Permanent opinion, Justice Souter quoted
a Fourth Circuit opinion saying that "it defies logic to argue that a
defense may not be asserted in the only situation where it even
becomes relevant." 215 Under the Ninth Circuit's view, the defendant
does not have the affirmative defense of fair use available if the
plaintiff shows by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a
likelihood of confusion.216 If the plaintiff fails in its proof, the
defendant can use the defense, but would not need it.2 17 Concluding
that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation was contrary to the language of
the statute and to logic, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit
opinion and remanded.2 18 Similarly, in Au-Tomotive Gold, the Ninth
Circuit held that if the plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the
210. Au-Tomotive Gold, 603 F.3d at 1138-1139.
211. Id.
212. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. 328 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.
2003).
213. Id. at 1073.
214. Id. at 1072.
215. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. Ill, 120 (2004)
(quoting Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., Inc., 110 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 1997)).
216. KP Permanent Make- Up, 328 F.3d at 1072.
217. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 120 (2004).
218. Id. at 124. See supra text accompanying notes 39-63.
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evidence that there is a likelihood of post-purchase confusion, the first
sale doctrine does not apply. Only when there is no likelihood of
confusion, as in Prestonnettes, Binzel, Dad's Kids Corp., and Scarves
by Vera, is the first sale doctrine applicable. In effect, the first sale
rule is no defense at all.
VI. DISTINGUISHING TRADEMARK LAW FROM COPYRIGHT AND
PATENT LAW
The previous section was not intended to suggest that the first
sale rule should be applied the same way in trademark law as in
copyright and patent or that a first sale defense in trademark law
should be analyzed the same way as a classic fair use defense. The
interests of information creators and consumers are more closely
aligned in trademark than in other areas of intellectual property. And
the justifications for classic fair use and the right of first sale are
different. This section distinguishes between trademark law on the
one hand, and copyright and patent law on the other, as a basis for
determining the proper procedural status and effect of the first sale
rule and the proper scope of permissible free-riding in the trademark
first sale context.
Unlike trademark law, the first sale rule in copyright and patent
provides an affirmative defense almost without exceptions. 2 19 A
plausible basis for distinguishing trademark law from copyright and
patent is the co-incidence of creators' and consumers' interests. All
three types of rights benefit consumers by creating incentives to
produce intellectual property information. Once the information is
created, however, consumers and suppliers share an interest in
maintaining the exclusivity of rights to trademarks. Suppliers'
interests are obvious. Having invested in publicizing a mark to attract
consumers through the familiarity of the widely advertised marks or
in maintaining consistency in the characteristics and qualities of
219. In copyright law, the statutory first sale doctrine contains two exceptions for
situations in which there is "rampant piracy" Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc'ns,
Inc., 474 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2007), ajfg in part, rev'g in part, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1236 (W.D. Mich.
2004), facilitated by the easy copying of musical works. See 17 U.S.C. §109(b)(1)(A) (2006)
(creating an exception of sound recordings and computer programs). There are no comparable
statutory exceptions in patent law, although many patents are licensed and goods sold with
contractual conditions limiting resale. See Kyle M. Costello, The State of the Patent Exhaustion
Doctrine, Post-Quanta v. LG Electronics, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237 (2010) (discussing
enforceability of contractual restrictions on purchasers of patented articles). In these patent
cases, one might argue that the contract price reflects those conditions, suggesting that the patent
owner has not obtained the full price for the sale and therefore justifying enforcement of the
terms.
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goods carrying those marks, suppliers naturally desire to obtain a
return on that investment and to profit from the loyalty of satisfied
customers. Consumers benefit by being able to rely on the source
indicating significance of marks that distinguish one supplier's goods
from another's. Doing so reduces the costs of searching for goods that
satisfy consumers' needs and helps ensure that they get the quality
and characteristics of goods they seek.
Courts have a variety of alternatives in deciding how to treat the
fact of first sale. The fact that a person has legally purchased a
patented, copyrighted, or trademarked item without contractual
restraints might logically result in his or her absolute right to resell the
item, as is generally true in patent and copyright law. Alternatively, it
might be irrelevant to his or her resale rights, as in the remanufactured
goods/post sale confusion context described in Au-Tomotive Gold
opinion. An intermediate position in trademark law would consider
the extent of confusion when evaluating whether the resale should be
permitted.
Consumers' interests are not totally aligned with trademark
owners' exclusive rights. Consumers benefit from competitors' use of
descriptive terms trademarked by others that indicate the qualities and
characteristics of the competitors' goods, which supports the classic
fair use defense. According to the Supreme Court, some confusion
may coexist with descriptive use. 22 0 Some courts have concluded that
the possibility of confusion is a risk suppliers take when they chose a
descriptive rather than an arbitrary or fanciful trademark.2 21
Consumers also benefit from competitors' use of others' marks
in comparative advertising. The Supreme Court has not spoken on
whether some confusion may coexist with the right to engage in
comparative advertising. When the question is whether an injunction
should prevent comparative use of another's mark, however, the
equitable balancing process requires that an injunction serve the
public interest. 2 22 Reviewing an injunction that prohibited a new
product's label from comparing its caloric content to that of a
competitor, the Seventh Circuit,223 looking at the rather weak
evidence of likely confusion among purchasers, concluded:
[All the district court found-all that it could find on this record-is
that Nabisco's packaging uses Storck's mark and that confusion is
220. See supra text accompanying note 64.
221. See supra text accompanying note 63.
222. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
223. August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 1995).
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possible. That is not enough to postpone the introduction of a new
product. When deciding whether to grant or withhold equitable
relief a court must give high regard to the interest of the general
public, which is a great beneficiary from competition. Although
the benefits of competition do not justify the introduction of
products that engender substantial confusion, when the plaintiffs
showing is as thin as Storck's the interests of the public carry the
day. 224
Like descriptive fair use, comparative advertising is a situation that
requires a balancing of interests rather than a straight prohibition.
Trademark law is rife with such challenging occasions for
225balancing the interests of consumers. One final example is Internet
initial interest confusion. Numerous federal circuit courts of appeal
have considered whether it is a trademark infringement for a search
company to sell advertisers the right to have their sponsored link or
banner ad appear whenever a computer user enters a competitor's
trademarked word as a search term.226 There is potential for a
computer user to believe initially that the link or ad is sponsored by
the trademark owner rather than the advertiser, even if that confusion
is dispelled immediately upon entering the website of the
advertiser.227 This practice may be a temporary obstacle for
consumers looking specifically for the trademark owner's product and
may divert sales from the trademark owner to the advertiser if the
consumer finds the advertised product more (or sufficiently)
224. Id. at 619.
225. See Stacey L. Dogan and Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs
on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. REV. 777, 777 (2004).
In theory, trademarks serve as information tools by conveying product
information through convenient, identifiable symbols. In practice, however,
trademarks have increasingly been used to obstruct the flow of information about
competing products and services. In the online context, in particular, some courts
have recently allowed trademark holders to block uses of their marks that would
never have raised an eyebrow in a brick-and-mortar setting-uses that increase,
rather than diminish, the flow of truthful, relevant information to consumers.
Id.
226. Compare 1-800 Contacts, Inc., v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 412 (2d Cir.
2005), with Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir.
2004).
227. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp, 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th
Cir. 2004) ("Initial interest confusion is customer confusion that creates initial interest in a
competitor's product. Although dispelled before an actual sale occurs, initial interest confusion
impermissibly capitalizes on the goodwill associated with a mark and is therefore actionable
trademark infringement). The Seventh Circuit, Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d
376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996), compared initial interest confusion to a "bait and switch" scheme,
"effectively allowing the competitor to get its foot in the door by confusing consumers."
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228
attractive. On the other hand, the practice helps consumers who are
aware of one brand of a particular product or service find competing
suppliers whose products may be more satisfactory and helps
advertising suppliers compete with dominant firms with famous
marks,22 9 thus promoting competition. If the interest of trademark law
is protecting goodwill by preventing other suppliers from benefitting
from the notoriety of another's mark, then free-riding should be
prohibited without regard to effect on competition. If consumers'
interests in searching for satisfactory goods are relevant, some more
subtle weighing may be appropriate.
The post-sale confusion cases are particularly clear examples of
conflicting consumer interests. On one side are purchasers of
reconditioned, repaired, or remanufactured goods or of new products
containing the trademarks of others who benefit from lower prices
and the availability of a wider range of products. In post-purchase
confusion cases, these buyers are aware of the source of the goods.
On the other side of the balance are non-purchasers who view those
goods and are likely to be confused about the source. As in the cases
of initial interest confusion case and the use of another's trademarked
term to describe the characteristics and qualities of one's own goods,
such as KP Permanent, the balance involves the interest in
competition.
228. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 94 F.3d at 382.
229. Barnes, supra note 120, at 36.
The increase in search costs from Internet initial interest confusion seems
small. It only applies to computer users trying to find a particular supplier ....
They must look more carefully on search results page for the official website. Or
they might open a link or click on an advertisement by mistake. As long as the
result is clearly not [the site of the trademark owner (as long as there is no
confusion at the point of sale), they need merely to click back to the search
results page.
Any increase in search costs is offset by the benefits of being able to find
potentially superior competitive market substitutes. For computer users looking
for a particular supplier, the addition to search costs is small. Sophisticated
computer users are accustomed to skipping right over any sponsored links that
are inapplicable. The increase in search cost argument does not apply at all to
consumers who are trying to find a supplier whose goods or services best fit their
needs.
As long as consumers know with whom they are dealing when they are
reviewing a particular supplier's website, there seem to be only competitive
advantages from permitting this conduct. Any customers lost to the mark owner
will be those equally or better satisfied by the competitor's product or those too
lazy to compare products. It does not seem desirable to protect the trademark
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Free-riding both interferes with and promotes competition.
Source confusion resulting from exclusive rights that are too weak
makes it more difficult for consumers to locate goods most
satisfactory to them. Exclusive rights that are too strong create
barriers to entry for suppliers unable easily to market their goods. The
KP Permanent solution to this is to tolerate only "some possibility
of ... confusion," 230 perhaps not a great deal or high probability of
confusion. This approach permits free-riding to some extent231 to
promote competition and recognizes the defendant's commercial
justification for using the term.232
The first sale rule has similar benefits and harms. The first sale
doctrine is based on the competitive advantages of free-riding.
Restraints on alienation interfere with the efficient allocation of
233 234
resources233 and restrict competition. Allowing reconditioning and
repair, and permitting the manufacture of new products incorporating
another's trademark, promotes competition and benefits consumers.
Accordingly, it would be logical to adopt a similar approach for a
defense based on first sale. The potential post purchase confusion is a
"second order" level of potential harm because the buyers of the
modified goods know exactly what they are buying. The level of
potential harm in post-sale confusion cases varies, with perhaps the
more serious harm occurring for imitations of luxury goods and low
quality goods235 and the least harm arising when the first sale rule is
implicated. Rather than giving no weight to the first sale rule when
post purchase confusion is possible, the Supreme Court's approach
would permit free-riding to some extent while tolerating some
possibility of confusion.
VII.CONCLUSION
Consumers' continuing interest in a single user's exclusive right
to use its own trademark suggests that the first sale defense should not
be as absolute as it is in copyright and patent law. Consumers' interest
in protecting exclusive rights to trademark in order to facilitate their
search for satisfactory goods goes beyond society's general interest in
230. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression 1, Inc., 543 U.S. Il l, 121-22
(2004) (stating that "some possibility of consumer confusion must be compatible with fair use
and so it is.").
231. Id. at 121-22.
232. Id. at 122-23. See supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
233. See supra sources cited in note I1.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 9-14.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 191-196.
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promoting investment in intellectual property information. As in
intellectual property law generally, however, there are conflicting
interests between creating incentives through strong exclusive rights
on the one hand, and promoting completion and facilitating consumer
choice by allowing free-riding on the other. This article argues that
free-riding alone is not a sufficient basis for finding that the first sale
rule is not defense to trademark infringement based on post-sale
confusion.
Serious modem analysis of intellectual property rights calls for a
balancing of interests. In post-sale confusion cases, the interests are
those of consumers and suppliers in preventing confusion and the
interests of consumers and competitors (and other market
participants) in reducing prices and promoting robust rivalry. This
balancing is not automatically weighted in favor of free access.
Where confusion is likely to be greater and where the other harms are
more likely and more severe, the first sale defense would not be
effective. The balance inherent in modem intellectual property law
merely precludes deciding first sale cases on the basis of free-riding
alone, without consideration of why free-riding is inappropriate in a
particular context, or without consideration of whether some free-
riding should not only be tolerated but encouraged.
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